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Abstract
How does financial development affect the magnitude of the business cycles fluctu-
ations? We examine this question in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents and endogenous credit constraints based on Kiyotaki (1998). We show that there
is a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of financial frictions and the amplifi-
cation of unexpected productivity shocks. This non-monotonic relation is due to the fall
in financial frictions having two opposite effects on the response of output. One effect is
the reallocation of productive inputs between agent types, which, while active, increases
with the fall in financial frictions. The other effect is the change in the demand of inputs,
which decreases with the fall in financial frictions. At low levels of financial development
the reallocation effect dominates and a fall in financial frictions increases the amplifi-
cation of productivity shocks. In contrast, at higher levels of financial development, a
fall in financial frictions decreases the shock amplification because the reallocation effect
disappears while the effect on the demand of inputs is still present.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of borrowing constraints, the financial sector amplifies business cycle fluc-
tuations in excess of the purely technological volatility. In this paper, we ask whether a more
developed financial sector leads to more or less amplification. We show that in an economy
with heterogenous agents and endogenous borrowing constraints, the degree of financial devel-
opment has two opposite effects, which generate a hump-shaped relationship between financial
development and the response of output to an unexpected productivity shock.
Our starting point is the model of endogenous borrowing constraints of Kiyotaki (1998),
where agents are heterogenous in their ability and production requires a durable and an
intermediate input. We modify the credit constraint by adding a financial efficiency parameter
— the level of financial development — to capture cross-country differences in institutional
quality and in financial innovation. We show that, depending on the value of this financial
efficiency parameter, the equilibrium can be one of three types. First, for low values of the
parameter, the well-known credit-constrained equilibrium arises, in which both constrained
and unconstrained agents engage in production. This is the only equilibrium considered in
Kiyotaki. The second equilibrium type occurs with larger values of the parameter and, in
this case, productive agents use all the available assets in the economy but remain credit
constrained when choosing their input purchases. Finally, the third equilibrium type occurs
with yet larger values of the parameter and corresponds to the case in which the borrowing
constraint is not binding for any agent and, hence, productive agents choose the unconstrained
input quantities.
As in the well-known model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the dynamic interaction be-
tween credit limits and asset prices amplifies the magnitude and persistence of temporary
productivity shocks. We find that this shock amplification first increases and then decreases
with financial development. This non-monotonicity is due to financial development having
two opposite effects on the income response to a negative productivity shock. First, financial
development increases what we call the durable input reallocation effect by raising the leverage
of productive agents. With higher leverage, more resources are reallocated between agents
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of different productivities after a technology shock. Second, financial development decreases
what we call the intermediate input demand effect by reducing the downpayment required to
buy the durable input. The lower the downpayment, the smaller the fall in the quantity of
intermediate input used in production after the shock.
To sum up, at low levels of financial development, a fall in financial frictions increases
the response of income to a negative productivity shock because it raises the magnitude of
the reallocation effect, which has a first-order impact on output. At higher levels of financial
development, the credit supply by unproductive agents becomes completely inelastic, which
implies that productive agents use all the productive resources before and after the shock.
When this is the case, the reallocation effect disappears. The effect on the intermediate input
demand, on the other hand, is still present while productive agents are constrained and, thus,
at higher levels of financial development, the shock amplification decreases with the fall in
financial frictions.
Related literature. There is a large theoretical literature studying the mechanisms
by which temporary shocks are amplified and made more persistent by the financial sector,
starting with Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and continuing
to this day with Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), among
others. We contribute to this literature by showing that the amplification of productivity
shocks induced by collateral constraints is non-monotonic with respect to the tightness of this
constraint.
Matsuyama (2008, 2013), Mendoza (2010), and Hirano and Yanagawa (2015) are closer to
our paper because they also explore the non-monotonic effects of changes of financial frictions
on aggregate quantities. Matsuyama (2008) points out that a recurring feature of models with
credit market frictions is that the “properties of equilibrium often respond non-monotonically
to parameter changes.” Our contribution is to make these properties explicit and show the
economic intuition behind them. In terms of technique we are closest to Kiyotaki and Moore
(2005), which analyzes the regions of the parameter space of their model to describe the
effects of financial intermediation on output and investment. A distinctive feature of our non-
monotonicity result in this setting is that it arises even when we restrict our attention to the
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regions in which productive agents are constrained. This feature contrasts with the results in
Mendoza, where the non-monotonicity result arises because financial development increases
amplification in a constrained equilibrium and, at the same time, decreases the likelihood of
being in that constrained equilibrium economy.
Our non-monotonicity result sheds light on the mixed empirical evidence of the effects of
financial development on growth and volatility. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) found that
financial liberalization in economies with underdeveloped financial systems is usually followed
by financial crises, while Jorda`, Schularick and Taylor (2011) show that credit growth is a
powerful predictor of economic crises. Related to this, Loayza and Rancie`re (2006) conclude
that economic growth is positively and significantly linked to financial intermediation in the
long run but negatively in the short run, especially for countries with high volatility. Easterly,
Islam and Stiglitz (2001), on the other hand, finds that a higher level of development of the
domestic financial sector is associated with lower volatility.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and analyzes
the equilibrium in detail. Section 3 describes the simulation of the model and discusses the
numerical results. Section 4 concludes. We leave the mathematical derivations and additional
results to the online appendix.
2 The model
Our model is an extension of the economy with heterogeneous agents and endogenous credit
constraints proposed by Kiyotaki (1998). Given their heterogeneity in productivity, agents
engage in borrowing and lending. This activity has a friction in the form of an endogenous
borrowing constraint, since lenders demand collateral because of the imperfect enforcement of
debt contracts. We introduce a parameter multiplying the value of the collateral, which we
interpret as a reduced form summary of potential factors easing or constraining the borrowing
and lending between agents. We call this parameter the degree of financial development.1
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2.1 Model details
In the economy, there is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents who have logarithmic pref-
erences over the consumption good and discount the future at the rate β. Agents produce the
final good with the following technoogy:
yit ≡ Ait−1
(
kit−1
σ
)σ (
xit−1
1− σ
)1−σ
, 0 < σ < 1,
where the productivity of agent i in period t, Ait−1, is equal to α if i is productive and to γ
if i is unproductive. The variable kit−1 denotes the durable input used by agent i in period t
and xit−1 the intermediate input. Both inputs are chosen one period in advance. The durable
input is in fixed supply and does not depreciate, while the intermediate input fully depreciates
every period. The durable input plays a dual role, as factor of production as well as collateral
for loans.
Agent’s type shifts stochastically between two states, the productive and the unproductive,
according to the following Markov process: productive agents become unproductive in the next
period with probability δ, and unproductive agents become productive with probability nδ,
where n < 1. Agents maximize their expected utility subject to the production technology
and the budget constraint ct+xt+qt (kt − kt−1) = yt+ bt+1rt −bt, where ct denotes consumption,
qt the price of the durable input, bt the debt repayment, bt+1 the new debt, and rt the gross
interest rate. At the same time, every period, agents face the borrowing constraint
bt+1 ≤ θqt+1kt, θ ∈ [0,∞), (1)
which says that the debt repayment cannot exceed the adjusted value of the collateral at
period t + 1. The parameter θ is a measure of the fraction of collateral that lenders can
recover.2
2.2 Equilibrium types
An equilibrium of this economy is defined in the standard way: a sequence of allocations
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for each type of agent {[ct, kt, xt, bt]∀i}∞t=0 and prices {qt, rt}∞t=0 such that i) agents maximize
their lifetime expected utility and ii) durable input, final good, and credit markets clear, i.e.,
´
i∈U (c
i
t + x
i
t) di +
´
i∈P (c
i
t + x
i
t) di =
´
i∈U y
i
tdi +
´
i∈P y
i
tdi,
´
i∈U k
i
t−1di +
´
i∈P k
i
t−1di = 1, and´
i∈U b
i
tdi +
´
i∈P b
i
tdi = 0, where U denotes the set of unproductive agents and P the set of
productive ones. There are three types of unique equilibria in our model, each corresponding
to a region of the parameter space of θ.
2.2.1 Equilibrium Type I: Constrained Productive Agents
Equilibrium type I occurs when the borrowing constraint is binding for productive agents
and all agents in the economy engage in production. In each period, both productive and
unproductive agents optimally chose to consume a fraction (1− β) of their wealth wt, defined
as wit ≡ yit + qtkit−1 − bit.
Unproductive agents. The optimal intermediate-to-durable input ratio of unproductive
agents is given by
xit
kit
= 1−σ
σ
ut, where ut ≡ qt − qt+1/rt is defined as the user cost of the
durable input. The real interest rate is equal to the rate of return of unproductive agents,
i.e. rt = γu
−σ
t when they engage in production. Intuitively, since in this equilibrium type
unproductive agents use their savings to lend and to produce, both rates of return must be
the same.
Productive agents. The optimal intermediate-to-durable input ratio of productive
agents,
xit
kit
≡ gt, depends positively both on the durable input user cost ut and, when θ < 1,
on the opportunity cost of the downpayment:
σ
1− σgt = ut + (1− θ)
qt+1
rt
(
ht − rt
ht
)
, (2)
where ht ≡ ∂yt+1∂xt = α
(
σ
1−σgt
)−σ
is the rate of return of productive agents, i.e. the marginal
product of the intermediate input. This rate of return exceeds the interest rate and, therefore,
productive agents borrow up to the credit limit.
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2.2.2 Equilibrium Type II: No Production by Unproductive Agents
The second type of equilibrium, which we call type II, is one in which the borrowing
constraint is still binding for productive agents but unproductive agents lend all their savings
and, thus, produce nothing. The equilibrium type II differs from type I in that productive
agents end up holding all the inputs in the economy.
To understand this equilibrium type better, it is useful to look at the credit market clearing
condition, − ´
i∈U b
i
tdi =
´
i∈P b
i
tdi, together with the unproductive agents’ budget constraint.
This determines the amount of durable input held by unproductive agents when the equilib-
rium type is I or II:
(
qt +
1− σ
σ
) ˆ
i∈U
kit = β (1− st)Wt −
ˆ
i∈P
θqt+1k
i
t
rt
di, (3)
where Wt denotes aggregate wealth and st the wealth share of productive agents. Condition
(3) determines whether a type I or type II equilibrium holds: if the right hand side is positive
when the interest rate is the type I interest rate, then equilibrium I prevails. If this is not
the case, then the equilibrium type is II: productive agents hold all the durable input and
the interest rate is equal to rt =
θqt+1
β(1−st)Wt .
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Figure 1 shows graphically the interest rate that equalizes the demand and supply of credit
for different values of θ. The supply of funds by unproductive agents is completely elastic at
γu−σt but it cannot be higher than their after-consumption wealth. The demand for funds by
productive agents, on the other hand, is completely elastic at αu−σt but, since they are credit
constrained, it cannot be higher than θ qt+1
rt
.4
2.2.3 Equilibrium Type III: Unconstrained Productive Agents
The third equilibrium type, which we call type III, occurs when the borrowing constraint
of productive agents is not binding. Unconstrained productive agents keep on borrowing and
acquiring production inputs as long as the interest rate is lower than their rate of return. This
equilibrium, thus, requires that the interest rate is equal to the rate of return of productive
agents and that productive agents are willing to hold all the durable input in the economy.
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The optimal input ratio for productive agents in this equilibrium type is the unconstrained
one, xt
kt
= 1−σ
σ
ut, and the interest rate now reflects the marginal product of the intermediate
input for productive agents, i.e. rt = αu
−σ
t .
3 Numerical Example
We now simulate the model to study the transition dynamics after an unexpected negative
aggregate productivity shock and evaluate them for different levels of financial development.
Under the parameter values chosen, the range θ ∈[0.75, 1.1] covers the three equilibrium types.
In Kiyotaki (1998) the financial efficiency parameter θ is equal to one. The author then makes
the necessary assumptions about the other parameter values to ensure the equilibrium is of
the first type.
3.1 Steady state
Given the logarithmic preferences and the linearity of the production functions, the equi-
librium of this economy can be described in terms of the aggregate wealth, Wt, the productive
agents wealth share, st, the durable input price, qt, and the durable input user cost, ut. When
(Wt+1, st+1, qt+1, ut+1) = (Wt, st, qt, ut), the economy is in a steady state. Figure 2 shows how
the steady-state level of some of these variables changes with the level of financial development.
In what follows we stress three results.
First, in equilibrium types I and II, the steady-state total ouptut increases with financial
development. Financial development improves the allocation efficiency of the economy by
increasing the fraction of resources used by productive agents and, as a consequence, output
increases.
Second, the optimal ratio of intermediate to durable input for constrained agents (i.e.
productive agents in equilibria I and II) is always larger than the the same ratio for un-
constratined agents, but the difference between the two ratios is decreasing in θ. This result
implies that the opportunity cost of the downpayment in equation (2) is positive and decreas-
ing with financial development.
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Third, financial development increases the demand and the price q of the durable input. By
decreasing the opportunity cost of the downpayment and the actual downpayment, financial
development reduces productive agents’ cost of acquiring the durable input. In addition,
financial development raises the wealth of productive and unproductive agents because it
increases the steady-state output. It follows that both agent types increase their demand for
the durable input and, hence, its price q also increases. The third plot in Figure 2 illustrates
this point.
3.2 Dynamics
We next explore the dynamics of the main variables after a 1% unexpected and temporary
negative shock to aggregate productivity. The magnitude of the shock and the values of θ
considered guarantee that the equilibrium type at every point in the transition is the same as
the one in steady state.5
Figure 3 shows the percentage deviation of output from steady state due to the productivity
shock for different values of θ. The evolution of output is almost identical for the two extreme
values of θ considered, θ = 0.75 and θ = 1, while it reacts more for intermediate values
of θ. The relationship between financial development and the shock amplification is non-
monotonic: when the equilibrium type is I, the deviation of output from steady state increases
with financial development; it drops significantly when the equilibrium type becomes II,
and decreases with financial development while the equilibrium type is II; once we reach
equilibrium type III, the deviation of output no longer depends on θ.
The pattern of this path is almost identical for the deviation of aggregate consumption,
aggregate wealth and the durable input relative price. It is also very similar to the paths of
the productive agents wealth share, the intermediate input purchases and total borrowings.
The online appendix contains the plots of all these variables.
3.3 Decomposition of the total effect on output
In the analysis that follows we explain why the reaction of output to a shock changes
non-monotonically with financial development. We start the analysis by tracing the reaction
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of output to changes in the quantity of durable and intermediate inputs used in production
(section 3.3). We then discuss the main drivers of the changes in the inputs and determine how
financial development affects them (section 3.4). Our analysis shows that the non-monotonic
reaction of output to a shock arises from financial development changing the leverage of
productive agents, the cost of the durable input, and the behavior of the credit market.
We first decompose the change in output after a shock into changes in the intermediate
and durable inputs. In any equilibrium type, total output is equal to output by productive
agents plus output by unproductive agents. Hence, in steady state, Y SS = α (g
SS)1−σ
σσ(1−σ)1−σK
SS
P +
γ
( 1−σ
σ
uSS)1−σ
σσ(1−σ)1−σ
(
1−KSSP
)
, where gSS is defined in equation (2) and KSSP denotes the amount of
durable input owned by productive agents in steady state.
By totally differentiating output with respect to the percentage change in productivity ∆
one period after the shock, we find that the elasticity of output is the sum of two effects – the
durable input reallocation effect and the intermediate input demand effect:
d lnY
d4 = ρ
SS d lnKp
d4︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reallocation effect
+ ψSS
(
(1− σ)d ln g
d4
)
+ 1− ψSS
(
(1− σ)d lnu
d4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intermediate input demand effect
. (4)
The first term in equation (4) measures how much output is lost or gained due to the reallo-
cation of the durable input from productive to unproductive agents. This term is the product
of the quantity of durable input that moves between agents, d lnKp
d4 , and the difference in the
marginal product of productive and unproductive agents, ρSS. The second term of equation
(4) is the impact on output of changes in the relative use of the intermediate input after the
shock. This term is a weighted average of the change in the relative use of the intermediate
input by productive and unproductive agents, with the weights ψSS and
(
1− ψSS) being their
respective share of the steady-state output.
The plots of Figure 4 show that the combination of the reallocation and intermediate
input effects generate the non-monotonic impact of financial development on the reaction of
output to a shock. In particular, in a type I equilibrium, the reallocation of the durable
input between agents has a first-order effect on output. Since this reallocation increases with
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financial development, so does the reaction of output to the shock. Once the equilibrium is in
regions II and III, the reallocation effect disappears, and only the intermediate input effect
persists. Since this effect decreases with financial development, so does the reaction of output
to the shock.6 In the next section we explore the drivers of the behavior of the reallocation
and intermediate input effects.
3.4 Results analysis
In this subsection we firstly examine why the reallocation effect increases with financial
development; secondly, why the intermediate input effect decreases with financial development
in regions I and II, and, thirdly, why the former dominates over the latter.
The reallocation effect increases with financial development. Following a negative
technology shock, productive agents’ wealth falls relatively more than the wealth of unproduc-
tive agents. This is called the balance sheet effect and it increases with financial development
because of the rise in productive agents’ borrowings. When the equilibrium type is I, it leads
to a reallocation of the durable input from productive to unproductive agents, which is now
used less efficiently. As a consequence, output falls. The first plot in Figure 5 shows that this
direct effect of the shock on KP is increasing with θ in regions I and II.
But, in a type I equilibrium, the effect on Kp does not stop here. The future price of
the durable input decreases after the negative technology shock. As a consequence, the credit
constraint tightens, productive agents demand less durable input, and the reallocation effect
is magnified. The second plot in Figure 5 shows this. The effect of the durable input price
becomes a more significant part of the total reallocation effect as θ increases, since changes
in qt+1 have a larger impact on the credit constraint when financial intermediation is high.
The reallocation effect, while active, has a first-order impact on output because it implies
transferring inputs from more productive to less productive.7 The intermediate input effect,
on the other hand, is just about each agent fine tuning the mix of inputs used in production.
The intermediate input demand effect decreases with financial development.
The intermediate input effect is driven by productive and unproductive agents changing the
optimal mix of inputs used in production after a shock. The elasticities d ln g
d4 and
d lnu
d4 in
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equation (4) measure these changes and both elasticities decrease with financial development
under equilibrium types I and II. This is because, ultimately, financial development increases
the elasticity of the durable input to its user cost (region II) and amplifies the fall in credit
after a negative shock (region I). These elasticities are shown in the third and fourth plot of
Figure 5.
Focusing first in region II, when a negative productivity shock hits the economy the
durable input demand falls. To clear the market, the user cost ut must decrease and, hence,
the elasticity d lnu
d4 is positive. Financial development reduces this elasticity since, by decreasing
the downpayment (1− θ) qt+1
rt
and its cost, it makes the durable input demand more sensitive
to the user cost ut. A smaller change in ut is thus necessary to clear the market, and so
the elasticity d lnu
d4 falls with θ. In addition, financial development reduces the increase in the
downpayment’s opportunity cost, (1− θ) qt+1
rt
(
1− rt
ht
)
, and thus the elasticity d ln g
d4 also falls
unambiguously with θ (see equation 2).
In region I, the change in the aggregate demand of the durable input after a shock is
ambiguous. In addition to the effects present in region II, a negative productivity shock
decreases tomorrow’s durable input price, qt+1
rt
, because rt is now inelastic (see Figure 1).
8 On
this account, the borrowing constraint tightens and total credit falls. The fall in credit has a
positive effect on the durable input aggregate demand because unproductive agents use this
input more intensively (see the second plot in Figure 2). If this was the only effect after a shock,
the user cost would have to increase to clear the market. Once we consider all the effects that
are also present in region II, the change in the aggregate demand of land is ambiguous, and
therefore the elasticity d lnu
d4 can be positive or negative. The negative relationship between
d lnu
d4
and θ, however, is not ambiguous. Specifically, since financial development increases the fall
in the durable input price qt+1
rt
, the elasticity d lnu
d4 must decrease with financial development.
This implies that the elasticity d ln g
d4 also falls with θ.
It remains to explain why there is a jump in the intermediate input demand effect between
regions I and II. This jump is due to the productivity shock having no effect on the discounted
durable input price qt+1
rt
in region II. In this region, unproductive agents lend all their resources
irrespective of the interest rate rt, and so the supply of credit is perfectly inelastic (see Figure
12
1). Changes in the demand of credit after a shock, i.e. changes in qt+1, are almost offset by
the price of credit rt.
9 Consequently, in region II, there is a larger fall in the user cost.
4 Concluding remarks
We extend the model of Kiyotaki (1998) to analyze the relationship between financial de-
velopment and the amplification of technological shocks. Financial intermediation amplifies
the technological component of business cycle fluctuations through the effects on the prices
of the collateral and the relative wealth of borrowers, as in the traditional models of en-
dogenous collateral constraints. Our contribution is to show that this amplification behaves
non-monotonically with financial development and that there is an intermediate size of the
financial sector which leads to the highest amplification.
We illustrate that this result is due to the relationship between financial development
and the effects of the productivity shock on the input purchases of each type of agents and,
more importantly, on the input reallocation across types of producers. While the former
has a negative relationship with the level of financial development because of the fall in
the downpayment cost, the latter, when active, has a positive relationship with the level of
financial development because of the rise in the leverage of productive agents.
In a richer setup with a continuum of productivity types, the response of income to a
shock could also be non-monotonic. For each level of financial development a productivity
cutoff would determine the set of agents active in production. A negative shock would lower
the cutoff level and persistently reduce the average productivity along the path to the steady-
state. The shock amplification would then depend on the magnitude of the changes in average
productivity which, in turn, would depend on the density of the productivity distribution at
the equilibrium cutoff.
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Notes
1. The details of the model are described in the online Appendix.
2. In the numerical section, we look at values of θ below and above 1, but all the relevant effects of financial
development take place for values smaller than 1. Empirically, the value of θ measured as the value of capital
structures over credit is smaller than one for most countries; in the case of the United States, it is equal to
0.98 (data source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis).
3. Provided that this interest rate is below the productive agents rate of return αu−σt , productive agents
would like to borrow more so they are indeed constrained.
4. For simplicity, we plot the credit demand and supply as if all the variables except the interest rate were
independent of θ, even though this is not the case in equilibrium.
5. The main results do not change when we consider values for θ such that the equilibrium type along the
dynamics differ from the steady-state equilibrium type but the analysis becomes more involved.
6. It is worth noting that the the reallocation effect is sufficient to generate a non-monotonic change in the
reaction of output. Shock amplification is zero when there is no financial intermediation and also when credit
constraints do not bind.
7. Given that it has a first-order impact on output, the reallocation effect is the main mechanism behind the
result in Kiyotaki (1998).
8. Strictly speaking, in region I the aggregate demand of durable input also depends on the unproductive
agents’ demand, which moves in the opposite direction than the productive agents’ demand.
9. For the sake of accuracy, the ratio qt+1rt does change in region II but by a small amount. In addition
to reacting to changes in qt+1, the interest rate rt is also affected by changes in the wealth of unproductive
agents. These changes are small and decrease with financial development.
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Figure 1: Credit market equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Steady-state output, input ratio and durable input price as a function of θ.
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Figure 3: Effect of financial development on shock amplification.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the total output elasticity to technology shocks.
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Figure 5: Financial development and inputs’ elasticities (first period)
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